SecurityKey Factor
The Mk5 protects its master secret with two secure elements from different manufacturers, a Microchip ATECC608C and a Maxim DS28C36B, next to an STM32L4S5 microcontroller. According to Coinkite's security model, the key that encrypts the seed is split across all three chips. The secure elements check the PIN: after 13 wrong attempts the device is permanently bricked, and Coinkite states that nobody, including Coinkite, can reset the counter. During PIN entry the screen shows two anti-phishing words, so a swapped unit can be spotted before the second half of the PIN is typed.
The bootloader verifies the factory signature on every boot, lights a green or red LED and refuses downgrades. Builds are reproducible and release hashes are PGP-signed. Coinkite calls the firmware open source; its licence is MIT plus the Commons Clause, which makes it source-available rather than OSI open source. Coinkite also calls it audited but has published no Mk5 audit report; the 5.6.1 changelog cites a fix from a Karma-X security review. Units ship in a serial-numbered tamper-evident bag.
July 2026 advisory: since a 2021 firmware change, seeds were generated with a software PRNG instead of the hardware RNG. For Mk4 and Mk5 seeds made before firmware 5.6.0 without at least 50 private dice rolls, Coinkite estimates about 72 bits of effective entropy instead of 128. Every Mk5 shipped from March to July 2026 ran affected firmware. Version 5.6.0 fixed the bug; 5.6.1 mixes the hardware RNG with both secure elements and requires user entropy. Updating does not repair an existing seed.




