EUCLEAK side channel in Infineon ECDSA library reaches Trezor Safe 3 and Safe 5 chip
Who is affected
An attacker with physical access and laboratory equipment could, per NinjaLab, extract ECDSA keys from the OPTIGA Trust M chip used in the Trezor Safe 3 and Safe 5. Trezor states the recovery seed and funds are not at risk because that cryptography does not protect the wallet backup.
What happened
On 3 September 2024 NinjaLab published EUCLEAK, research by Thomas Roche describing an electromagnetic side-channel vulnerability in the ECDSA implementation of Infineon’s cryptographic library, caused by a non-constant-time modular inversion. The researchers demonstrated the attack on a YubiKey 5Ci and state that it also affects Infineon’s OPTIGA Trust M and OPTIGA TPM security microcontrollers. NinjaLab says the flaw went unnoticed for 14 years and lists crypto-currency hardware wallets among the systems built on the affected chips, while noting it had not checked whether the attack applies to them. MITRE assigned CVE-2024-45678.
According to the researchers, the attack requires physical access to the secure element, after which a few minutes of local electromagnetic measurements are enough to extract an ECDSA secret key. BleepingComputer adds that it needs extended physical access, specialised equipment and a high level of expertise in electronics and cryptography. NinjaLab states that Infineon has a patch for its cryptographic library.
Trezor’s documentation says the Trezor Safe 3 and Safe 5 use an OPTIGA Trust M (V3) secure element, which enforces the PIN, holds a secret that together with the PIN encrypts the keys on the main chip, and stores a certificate used for authenticity checks. On 4 September 2024 Trezor stated that it had been alerted to the vulnerability affecting the OPTIGA Trust M in the Safe 3 and Safe 5, that it cannot be used to extract the recovery seed because the affected cryptography is not involved in creating or protecting the device backup, and that funds remain secure. CriptoNoticias reports that Trezor also said the flaw could in theory allow its authenticity check to be bypassed, a counterfeit risk Trezor says other supply-chain measures mitigate.
None of the sources reports an update for the OPTIGA Trust M in devices already sold; Trezor said it would share any new findings.
Timeline: NinjaLab announced the research and submitted the paper to the IACR ePrint archive on 3 September 2024; Trezor published its statement on 4 September 2024.
A digital signature is a cryptographic method that uses a private key to sign blockchain transactions, verifiable with the public key to prove authenticity and prevent tampering.
Read full definitionCryptocurrency is a digital or virtual currency secured by cryptography, operating on decentralized blockchain networks to enable secure, peer-to-peer transactions.
A hardware wallet is a dedicated device that keeps private keys offline and signs transactions internally, so the keys never reach an internet-connected computer or phone.
A secure element is a tamper-resistant chip built to store secrets and resist physical attacks such as side-channel analysis and fault injection.
Read full definitionA private key is the secret number that proves ownership of a crypto address and signs its transactions. Whoever has it controls the funds.
PIN Protection is a security feature that requires a personal identification number (PIN) to access a cryptocurrency wallet or device, preventing unauthorized access.
Read full definitionA mnemonic phrase is a set of words that stores a cryptocurrency wallet's private keys, allowing users to recover access if lost.
Read full definitionA backup in cryptocurrency is a secure copy of a wallet's seed phrase or private keys. It enables recovery of funds if the original wallet is lost or damaged.
Read full definitionSources
Independent reporting and research this entry was checked against.
- NinjaLab — EUCLEAK (3 Sep 2024)
- IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive — EUCLEAK, Thomas Roche, paper 2024/1380 (3 Sep 2024)
- BleepingComputer — New Eucleak attack lets threat actors clone YubiKey FIDO keys (4 Sep 2024)
- Trezor on X — Security Update: EUCLEAK (4 Sep 2024)
- CriptoNoticias — Vulnerabilidad inadvertida por 14 años afecta wallets de criptomonedas (6 Sep 2024)
- Trezor — Secure Element in Trezor Safe devices (undated)
Learn more
Guides on protecting yourself against this type of incident (Hardware attack) and the glossary terms that describe it.
Can Hardware Wallets Be Hacked?
Hardware wallets are extremely secure, but not invincible. Understand the real risks and attack vectors.
Read GuideEvil Maid Attack: Protecting Unattended Hardware Wallets
Someone accesses your wallet while you are away. Hotel rooms, offices, shared spaces — how to detect and prevent physical tampering.
Read GuideProtecting Your Hardware Wallet from Physical Theft
What happens if someone steals your hardware wallet? How to set up layers of protection so theft alone cannot compromise your crypto.
Read GuideFault Injection
Fault injection disturbs a chip's voltage, clock or electromagnetic environment so that it skips a security check or leaks data.
Side-Channel Attack
A side-channel attack in cryptocurrency and blockchain targets indirect information, like power usage or timing, to extract sensitive data from a system or device.
Secure Element
A secure element is a tamper-resistant chip built to store secrets and resist physical attacks such as side-channel analysis and fault injection.
Evil Maid Attack
An evil maid attack is a physical security threat where an attacker gains temporary unsupervised access to a hardware wallet to tamper with it, install malicious firmware, or extract private keys.
Cite this entry
WalletInsights. “EUCLEAK side channel in Infineon ECDSA library reaches Trezor Safe 3 and Safe 5 chip”. Hardware wallet security incident tracker. Last verified November 3, 2026. https://walletinsights.io/en/security-incidents/eucleak-infineon-side-channel-trezor-safe-2024/
Corrections and right of reply
Vendors, researchers and readers can send corrections or statements to security@walletinsights.io. We check them against the sources, update the entry and record the change in its log.
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