Kraken extracts Trezor One and Model T seeds by voltage glitching
Who is affected
Someone holding a Trezor One or Model T without a passphrase could recover its seed with specialised equipment in about 15 minutes. A device protected by a BIP39 passphrase is not exposed, according to both Kraken and Trezor.
What happened
On 31 January 2020 Kraken Security Labs published research showing it could extract the encrypted seed from Trezor One and Trezor Model T devices with about 15 minutes of physical access. Kraken says it disclosed the full details to Trezor on 30 October 2019.
According to Kraken, the attack uses voltage glitching to bypass the microcontroller’s read protection and dump the flash memory; the PIN protecting the encrypted seed is then brute-forced, which Kraken reports took under 2 minutes for a 4-digit PIN on a single CPU core. Its setup cost several hundred dollars, and it estimated a consumer-friendly glitching device could be mass-produced for about $75. Decrypt notes that the attack includes opening the device’s case.
Kraken attributes the flaw to the microcontroller and says fixing it would require new hardware; its CSO told The Block that Trezor “would essentially need to put out a new device”. In its response of 31 January 2020, Trezor states that the attack requires opening the case, removing the chip from the board and connecting it to specialised equipment, so an attacked device shows visible signs of tampering, and that a strong passphrase fully mitigates it.
What to do:
- Enable a BIP39 passphrase. It is not stored on the device, so it blocks this attack (Kraken, Trezor).
- Do not let anyone gain physical access to your device.
Fault injection disturbs a chip's voltage, clock or electromagnetic environment so that it skips a security check or leaks data.
Read full definitionPIN Protection is a security feature that requires a personal identification number (PIN) to access a cryptocurrency wallet or device, preventing unauthorized access.
Read full definitionA passphrase is an additional security layer for cryptocurrency wallets, acting as a 25th word in the BIP39 seed phrase, protecting access to hidden wallets.
Read full definitionBIP39 is a standard for generating mnemonic seed phrases that are used to create deterministic wallets and securely back up cryptocurrency private keys.
Read full definitionSources
Independent reporting and research this entry was checked against.
Change log
- Checked against Trezor's own statement, now linked; details from it added.
Learn more
Guides on protecting yourself against this type of incident (Hardware attack) and the glossary terms that describe it.
Can Hardware Wallets Be Hacked?
Hardware wallets are extremely secure, but not invincible. Understand the real risks and attack vectors.
Read GuideEvil Maid Attack: Protecting Unattended Hardware Wallets
Someone accesses your wallet while you are away. Hotel rooms, offices, shared spaces — how to detect and prevent physical tampering.
Read GuideProtecting Your Hardware Wallet from Physical Theft
What happens if someone steals your hardware wallet? How to set up layers of protection so theft alone cannot compromise your crypto.
Read GuideFault Injection
Fault injection disturbs a chip's voltage, clock or electromagnetic environment so that it skips a security check or leaks data.
Side-Channel Attack
A side-channel attack in cryptocurrency and blockchain targets indirect information, like power usage or timing, to extract sensitive data from a system or device.
Secure Element
A secure element is a tamper-resistant chip built to store secrets and resist physical attacks such as side-channel analysis and fault injection.
Evil Maid Attack
An evil maid attack is a physical security threat where an attacker gains temporary unsupervised access to a hardware wallet to tamper with it, install malicious firmware, or extract private keys.
Cite this entry
WalletInsights. “Kraken extracts Trezor One and Model T seeds by voltage glitching”. Hardware wallet security incident tracker. Last verified November 3, 2026. https://walletinsights.io/en/security-incidents/kraken-trezor-voltage-glitch-seed-extraction-2020/
Corrections and right of reply
Vendors, researchers and readers can send corrections or statements to security@walletinsights.io. We check them against the sources, update the entry and record the change in its log.
All Trezor incidents
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- Breach at shipping provider ShipMonk exposes data of up to 80,689 Trezor customers
- Laser fault injection bypasses firmware checks on Trezor Safe 7's TROPIC01 chip
- Ledger Donjon bypasses Trezor Safe 3 supply-chain protections
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