Ledger Donjon dumps encrypted keys from the Ellipal EC01 via debug ports

On 25 June 2019 Ledger’s security team, Ledger Donjon, published research on the Ellipal hardware wallet, a MediaTek MT6580-based device that Ellipal later identified as the EC01 (not in our catalog). The researchers say the work was responsibly disclosed to Ellipal before publication; the post gives no dates.

According to Ledger Donjon, an active UART debug interface and USB test points on the board could be used, after opening the enclosure and soldering, to switch the device into fastboot or factory test mode and dump or rewrite its flash memory. The dump contained users’ encrypted private keys, which the researchers say are protected by a weak password check: they estimate a fully random 8-character password can be brute-forced within minutes on a desktop computer. They add that flash write access could be used to pre-seed a device or plant a key-exfiltrating backdoor (supply-chain or evil-maid attacks), that the WiFi chip was disabled only in software, and that firmware updates used 3DES in ECB mode with a fixed key, although they could not load modified firmware.

Ellipal’s response of 20 December 2019 states that Ledger did not extract any seeds from the EC01, that the seed-extraction scenario depended on physical access and several steps, and that a brief software test found no vulnerabilities. Ellipal says it released firmware v2.0, which it states prevents dump attacks and modifications, and that its Titan model (launched September 2019) has no USB data or network interface and anti-disassembly protection. Ledger Donjon notes that Ellipal paid a bounty and started a bounty program, but that the researchers did not verify the v2 firmware.

What Ellipal advises:

• Keep your seed phrase offline.
• If you do not trust the keys the device generates, import your own keys or use a passphrase.
• Use Ellipal’s open-source tools to verify update files and QR code data.